Eavesdropping under Court Order and the Constitution: Berger v. New York by Fife, Phillip K.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1968
Eavesdropping under Court Order and the
Constitution: Berger v. New York
Phillip K. Fife
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Phillip K. Fife, Eavesdropping under Court Order and the Constitution: Berger v. New York, 1 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 143 (1968).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol1/iss1/8
EAVESDROPPING UNDER COURT ORDER AND
THE CONSTITUTION: BERGER v. NEW YORK'
by Philip K. Fife
In a society where the privacy of the individual is being diminished on all
frohts, the mushrooming expansion of electronic surveillance is viewed by many as
the impending coup de grace that could mark the end of individual privacy al-
together. Electronic surveillance can assume many forms, but recent advances in
technology have brought the form known as electronic eavesdropping to an almost
insidious level of sophistication.
Electronic eavesdropping has been defined as embracing all forms of electronic
surveillance except wiretapping.2 Although thirty-six states prohibit wiretapping,
only seven proscribe electronic eavesdropping as well.3 Six of those seven, however,
permit "authorized" eavesdropping in some form.4
Inadequate statutory control, lax enforcement of existing laws, and the difficult
problems of earnest enforcement have combined to create a smorgasbord of sur-
reptitious surveillance in which both government and the private sector busily in-
dulge. The principal opponents in the growing controversy over electronic surveil-
lance are those who condemn such activity by anyone and law enforcement officials
who insist that such surveillance is an indispensable tool needed to combat
crime, especially organized crime. A recent decision by the nation's highest court
reviewed the constitutional questions involved in a state statute permitting elec-
tronic surveillance by state officers under court order. In Berger v. New York,5 the
Court answered those questions in a manner clearly expanding the privacy of the
individual. It declined, however, to characterize official electronic surveillance as
unconstitutional per se.
Petitioner Berger was indicted and convicted in the Supreme Court of New
York County as a go-between in a conspiracy to bribe the Chairman of the New
York State Liquor Authority. Both the indictment and the conviction rested heavily
upon evidence which the state secured by "bugging" the offices 'of two alleged
co-conspirators. The "bugging" was effected with recording devices secretly planted
in the offices under the authority of separate ex parte orders issued by a New
York Supreme Court justice. The New York Code of Criminal Procedure section
813-a provided for an ex parte order for electronic eavesdropping.
An ex parte order for eavesdropping may be issued by any justice of the supreme
court... upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney ... that there is reasonable
ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly
describing the person or persons whose communications, conversations, or discussions
are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof.... Any such order shall be
187 S. Ct. 1873 (1967).
2Comment, Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 355, n.
1 (1966).
387 S. Ct. 1873,1878 an. 4 & 5 (1967).
41d. at 1878.
5id.
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effective for the time specified therein but not for a period of more than two months
unless extended or renewed by the justice or judge who signed and issued the original
order upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in the public interest... 0
The first order, effective for sixty days, was issued on the basis of information
brought to the attention of the district attorney's office by a party claiming he had
been harassed by State Liquor Authority agents because he had refused to pay a
bribe. The initial "bug" produced information which led the same justice to issue
a second order, also effective for sixty days, authorizing the concealment of a
recorder in the office of the other alleged conspirator. The conspiracy and
petitioner's involvement were uncovered within two weeks. Petitioner objected
to the admission of the eavesdropping evidence throughout his trial and subse-
quent appeals. Both the Appellate Division7 and the New York Court of Appeals"
affirmed the conviction without opinion.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment
by a six-to-three margin. In an opinion joined by four other justices, Justice Clark
declared that section 813-a on its face violated the fourth amendment, made
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.9 In disposing of the matter on this basis, the majority emphasized that the
fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment was "to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials."'1
Petitioner Berger had challenged section 813-a as applied in his case, and his
challenge of the statute on its face included arguments based on the fifth and
ninth amendments as well as the fourth amendment. By permitting the peti-
tioner to challenge the statute on its face, the Court elevated the individual right
of privacy under the fourth amendment to that category of basic rights which it
seems inclined to most zealously protect against government invasion. As it has
done in situations where the rights threatened by a state statute are first amendment
rights of free expression," the Court turned directly to section 813-a without
pausing to examine its application in this particular case.
The majority held that the provision in section 813-a for the issuance of the
eavesdropping order by a judge satisfied the requirement that "a neutral and de-
tached authority be interposed between the police and the public"' 2 to weigh the
evidence presented by an officer seeking a search warrant. Although New York
contended that the "reasonable ground" in section 813-a was intended, and had
6N.Y. CODE CpaM PROC. § 813-a (McKinney Supp. 1966); this section was amended,
N. Y. CODE Cram. PROC § 813-a (McKinney Supp. effective Sept. 1, 1967).
725 App. Div. 2d 718, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (1966).
818 N.Y. 2d 638, 272 N.Y.S. 2d 782 (1966).
9Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1087 S. Cr. 1873, 1880-81 (1967).
11Sea Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940).
12Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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been construed by the state courts,13 to be the equivalent of the "probable cause"
requirement of the fourth amendment 14 warrant clause, Justice Clark was
reluctant to believe that this language obviated any serious question as to the issue
of "probable cause." Since the statute was deemed unconstitutional in other re-
spects, however, Clark did not decide that question.
Section 813-a was found deficient by the majority for failing to require the
following:
1) a particular description of the place in which the eavesdropping was to be conducted;
2) a particular description of the nature of the conversations (things) sought to be
recorded (seized);
3) a particular description of the crime or crimes sought to be investigated;
4) automatic termination of the eavesdropping authority as soon as the information
originally sought had been obtained;
5) a fresh showing of present probable cause to justify an extension or renewal of an
eavesdropping order;
6) a showing of some special facts in order to overcome the objection that the eaves-
dropping, unlike conventional searches, was carried on without notice;
7) a return on the eavesdropping order to limit the officer's discretion as to the use of
innocent as well as incriminating conversations.
On the basis of these deficiencies, Clark said the statute authorized a "blanket grant
of permission to eavesdrop without adequate judicial supervision or protective
procedures."' 5
The majority was not convinced that electronic eavesdropping is as indispensable
as most law enforcement officials insist it is. Clark asserted that the requirements
of the fourth amendment could not, in any event, be relaxed in the name of law
enforcement. Although he believed that "[flew threats to liberty exist which are
greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices,"'1 Justice Clark
intimated that under proper conditions and circumstances such devices could be
used without violating the fourth amendment. The majority, however, thought the
New York statute was too similar to the historically condemned general warrant.
Justice Stewart, concurring in the result, agreed that electronic eavesdropping
was not unconstitutional per se. However, he did not believe the statute itself was
objectionable, resting his vote instead on what he considered to be the insuffi-
ciency of the affidavits presented to the justice who issued the order. He asserted
that reasonableness under the fourth amendment "demands that the showing of
1People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
14U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
1587 S. Ct. 1873, 1884 (1967).
61Id. at 1885.
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justification match the degree of intrusion."' 7 Electronic eavesdropping for sixty
days, even of a specified office, was so broad an invasion of a constitutionally
protected area that only the "most precise and rigorous standard of probable
cause"' 8 could justify it.
In another concurring opinion, Justice Douglas branded wiretapping and
"bugging" as the greatest of all invasions of privacy. Taking the view that any
electronic surveillance which leads to or collects evidence is unconstitutional, he
declared that the statute should be struck down simply because it authorized a
search for "mere evidence." This contention had been rejected by Clark on the
basis of the Court's recent decision in Warden v. Hayden,0 overturning the "mere
evidence" rule under which items of an evidentiary nature only could not be
seized during a constitutionally valid search. Justice Douglas had dissented in the
Hayden case, however, finding no meaningful difference between a search for
"mere evidence" and the general warrant.
Justice Black in dissent took issue with the majority's interpretation of the pro-
tections afforded by the fourth' amendment. He insisted that the amendment does
not discuss privacy but, rather, is concerned with physical searches for tangible
things. Tracing the history of eavesdropping from the early common law, he as-
serted that these practices, however unsavory, have proved invaluable in com-
batting crime. Moreover, he said, there was no constitutional ground for excluding
the use of evidence seized in contravention of the requirements of the fourth
amendment.20 He criticized the majority for dwelling on the statute itself
without adequately examining its application to this particular case. Justice Black
agreed with the other dissenters that neither the statute nor its application in this
case was objectionable.
Justice Harlan in dissent criticized the Court's decision to permit the petitioner
to challenge section 813-a on its face rather than as applied to him. He examined
the actual circumstances attending the issuance of the orders and concluded that
the overall procedure had violated none of the petitioner's rights. He particularly
assailed the majority for disregarding the construction which the New York courts
had placed on section 813-a.
Justice White also dissented, concluding that the surveillance practiced in this
case had satisfied the requirements of the fourth amendment. He thought the
majority had unrealistically discounted the importance of the need for electronic
surveillance in combatting crime.
The Berger decision represents a significant development in the treatment of
official electronic surveillance which the Court began thirty years ago. In Olmstead
v. United States,21 the Court examined the constitutional implications of wire-
tapping for the first time. The petitioners had been convicted of violating a federal
act primarily on the basis of evidence obtained through wiretaps of their home and
171d. at 1888.
181d.
19385 U.S. 926 (1967).
20See 87 S. Ct. 1873,1892 nn. 2 & 3 (1967).
21277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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office telephones. The wiretaps had been effected without any physical invasion
of either the petitioner's homes or their offices. The majority held that liberal
construction of the fourth amendment could "not justify enlargement of the
language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons,
papers, and effects, or so to apply the words 'search and seizure' as to forbid hearing
or sight."22 The Court declared that wiretapping without physical trespass did not
constitute a search and that evidence obtained by hearing could not be the subject
of a seizure. Under applicable state law wiretapping was a misdemeanor, but the
Court held that this fact would not justify exclusion of wiretap evidence in a
federal criminal trial.
In Olmstead, Justice Holmes argued in dissent that the government ought not to
use evidence obtained, and only obtainable, by a criminal act. Noting that in Weeks
v. United States 3 the Court had ruled evidence obtained by an unconstitutional
search and seizure inadmissible in a federal prosecution, Holmes reasoned that
evidence obtained by criminal acts of law enforcement officers should also be
excluded. Holmes observed that for his part he thought it "less evil that some
criminals should escape than that Government should play an ignoble part."24
Holmes was not alone in disagreeing with the reasoning and the result reached
by the majority. Another eminent jurist, Justice Brandeis, found that the majority's
interpretation of the protections afforded by the fourth amendment concentrated
on the form of the evil as it existed when the amendment was written rather
than on the evil itself. He said that the Constitution gave the individual "the
right to be let alone."25 He stated that every unjustifiable intrusion by the govern-
ment upon the privacy of the individual should be a violation of the fourth
amendment. In implementing that protection, he argued, the Court should be
capable of adapting the language to take into account a changing world wherein
"[s]ubtler and more far reaching means for invading privacy"26 continue to de-
velop. He accurately predicted that "the progress of science in furnishing the gov-
ernment with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping."
27
The majority in Olmstead had suggested that Congress could protect the secrecy
of telephone messages by direct legislation. In Nardone v. United States,28 section
605 of the Federal Communications Act of 193429 was construed as just such
legislation. While many observers believed that section 605 was passed in response
to the Olmstead holding, the Justice Department argued that it was enacted only as
221d. at 465.
2232 U.S. 383 (1914).
24Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,470 (1928).
251d. at 478.
261d. at 473.
271d. at 474.
28302 U.S. 379 (1937).
2947 U.S.C. §605 (1964):
. . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person....
1968)
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an incident to the creation of the Federal Communications Commission and the
transfer of jurisdiction over wire and radio communications to that body. Peti-
tioner's conviction for violation of a federal act rested on evidence obtained by
wiretaps which federal agents had set up without any physical trespass. The Court
held that the statute applied to federal law enforcement agents and that the intro-
duction of an unlawfully intercepted message into evidence in a federal court was
prohibited divulgence of that message. Thus, the Court ruled that the direct use
of evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of section 605 would not be
permitted in a federal court. The parties returned two years later, 0 and the Court
ruled that the indirect use of such evidence was proscribed as well. The exclu-
sionary rule thus formulated for evidence obtained in violation of section 605
closely paralleled the exclusionary rule applied to evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment. Neither kind of evidence could be used, directly or in-
directly, in a federal prosecution. The exclusionary rule for evidence seized in vio-
lation of the fourth amendment was later extended to state prosecutions; 1 but the
case of Schwartz v. Texas,32 holding that wiretap evidence is admissible in the
state courts notwithstanding the violation of section 605, has not been overruled.
In Goldman v. United States,3 3 a detectaphone had been placed against the wall
of an office adjacent to that occupied by the petitioner. Federal agents were thus
able to overhear conversations of the petitioner with visitors in his office as well
as one end of his telephone calls. In affirming a conviction resting on the evidence
so obtained, the Court held that the use of the detectaphone involved no trespass
or unlawful entry which could justify exclusion of that evidence. It also held that
section 605 was directed at protecting the integrity of the communications system
itself and, accordingly, the overhearing of one end of a telephone conversation
was not an unlawful "interception."
The physical intrusion concept of the eavesdropping problem approached its
logical extreme in Silverman v. United States.34 There, a microphone with a one-
foot spike had been driven through a party wall separating petitioner's home from
an adjoining house in which federal agents were situated. The spike made contact
with a heating duct in the petitioner's home thereby setting up a sound-gathering
system that enabled the officers to overhear virtually all conversations in the peti-
tioner's home. The conviction was reversed, the Court holding that the evidence
on which it rested was obtained by an unlawful physical penetration of the peti-
tioner's home. The Court pointed out that its decision did not depend on whether a
technical trespass under local property law had occurred. Rather, it was based on
the "reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."as The
majority maintained the position taken in Goldman that overhearing one end of a
0Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
31MapP v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32344 U.S. 199 (1952).
33316 U.S. 129 (1940).
34365 U.S. 505 (1961).
5Id. at 516.
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telephone conversation was not an "interception" within the meaning of section
605. Justice Douglas, concurring in the result, failed to see any difference between
the Goldman and Silverman situations. He emphasized that the key issue was the
invasion of privacy and that constitutional rights should not be measured in inches.
The Silverman case overruled sub silentio the majority holding in the Olmstead
case that conversations could not be the subject of a seizure. In Wong Sun v.
United States,36 the Court explicitly held that "the Fourth Amendment may protect
against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional
seizure of 'papers and effects'.
'3
T
The first case in which the court dealt with a carried "bug" was On Lee v.
United States.38 An old acquaintance of the petitioner had become a government
informant. Equipped with a concealed transmitter, he was sent to discuss the pur-
chase of some narcotics with the petitioner who had been released on bail following
an arrest on a narcotics charge. The conversation occurred in petitioner's place
of business, and an enforcement agent was stationed outside with a receiver.
Petitioner's conviction followed from the agent's testimony as to the statements
he had overheard. The government did not call the informant to testify. In
affirming the conviction, the Court held that the informants fraud in gaining
entry to the petitioner's business quarters did not make the evidence obtained in-
admissible. The doctrine of trespass ab initio was viewed as a rule of civil liability
that had no bearing on the right of the government to use evidence in a criminal
prosecution. The Court found no analogy between an illegal search and seizure
and eavesdropping on a conversation with the consent of one of the parties thereto. 9
Eleven years later, the Court faced a similar situation in Lopez v. United States.40
In that case, a federal tax agent had indicated to the petitioner that his possible
liability for past and present cabaret taxes would be investigated. The petitioner
proffered money to the agent, intimating that if the agent would "fix things"
more money would be forthcoming. After reporting his conversation to his
superiors, the agent returned to petitioner's establishment to discuss matters fur-
ther. This time, however, he carried a concealed recorder. On the basis of both
the agent's testimony and the recording, petitioner was convicted of attempting to
bribe a federal officer. In affirming the conviction, the Court held that the re-
cording device had only been used to "obtain the most reliable evidence possible
of a conversation."41 The majority noted that the device had not been planted
by means of an unlawful physical intrusion nor had it been used to overhear a
conversation that could not have been heard otherwise. The Court emphasized that
Lopez knew he was talking to a federal agent conducting an official investigation
who might later testify against him.
Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result, but he stressed that the decision
86371 U.S. 471 (1963).
37id. at 485.
38343 U.S. 747 (1952).
ald. at 754.
40373 U.S. 427 (1963).
411d. at 439.
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should not be taken as a reaffirmance sub silentio of the On Lee decision. Rather,
it was his opinion that On Lee should be overruled. He distinguished between the
use of a concealed "bug" to corroborate the testimony of a participant to a conversa-
tion and its use as a substitute for such testimony. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Douglas and Goldberg, agreed with the Chief Justice that On Lee should be
overruled, but he did not view that decision as materially distinguishable from the
case before the Court. His dissent regarded electronic surveillance as importing a
peculiarly severe danger to personal liberty. While conceding that a person who
discloses his private thoughts to another voluntarily assumes the risk that his
listener will not keep them in confidence, Brennan insisted that one should not be
required to anticipate that his listener is carrying a recorder.
The dissenting justices in Lopez expressed dissatisfaction with the overall approach
to the problem of electronic surveillance. They called for recognition that such
surveillance amounted to a search, irrespective of the presence or absence of a phys-
ical intrusion. Brennan reasoned that the fruits of an electronic search should be
denied to the government unless the requirements of the fourth amendment had
been satisfied. While realizing that the differences between an electronic search
and the conventional search raised serious obstacles to the development of a valid
warrant for the former, Justice Brennan asserted that it was "premature to con-
clude that no warrant for an electronic search can possibly be devised."
42
Under the "physical intrusion" approach to electronic surveillance, an uncon-
sented physical entry into a constitutionally protected area was a necessary con-
comitant of a search. Electronic surveillance accomplished without such invasion
simply was not a search. In the "planted bug" cases, consent was dearly absent and
the Court instead pondered whether there had been an actual physical entry. The
resolution of this question produced the inconsistency in the Goldman and Silver-
man decisions. This inconsistency became even more pronounced when, in Clinton
v. Virginia,43 it was indicated that the penetration of a thumbtack could be a
sufficient physical invasion.
In the "carried bug" situation, there was an obvious physical entry and the real
issue was whether there had been consent. In On Lee, the majority had relied on
the fact that the petitioner had consented to the presence of a party carrying a
concealed transmitter, albeit the consent was given in ignorance of the true pur-
pose of the visit. The majority brushed aside the obvious objection that the consent
would never have been given had the petitioner known he would thereby subject
himself to electronic surveillance. Perhaps troubled by this, the majority in Lopez
fortified the finding of consent with the observation that the petitioner knew he
was talking to a federal agent who might testify against him later.
A year after the Lopez decision, the Court in Massiah v. United States44 en-
countered a factual situation strikingly similar to that of the On Lee case. Petitioner
421d. at 464.
43377 U.S. 158 (1964).
44377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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and an accomplice had been arrested and the latter decided to cooperate with
federal agents. The accomplice allowed agents to conceal a transmitter in his car,
and he thereafter engaged the petitioner in conversation about the upcoming case
while both were sitting in the "bugged" auto. Regular federal agents parked nearby
in a receiver-equipped car testified as to incriminating statements by the petitioner
which they had overheard. In reversing a conviction based on this testimony, the
Court held that the "interrogation" had violated the petitioner's sixth amendment
right to counsel.
Although Massiah presented an opportunity to squarely uphold or reverse the
On Lee decision, the Court instead broke new ground by disposing of the case as it
did. The Court's thinking as to what the sixth amendment right to counsel actually
embraced had no doubt undergone development in the twelve years between On
Lee and Massiah. However, Massiah was a splendid case for clarifying important
fourth amendment questions, and it was a somewhat imperfect case for treating
sixth amendment questions because of the eavesdropping complication. The
Court's treatment of Massiah strongly suggests that it was becoming dissatisfied
with the then prevailing theories applied to the "carried bug-" situation. The risk
element alluded to in the treatment of the petitioner's consent in Lopez held
forth the possibility that the finding of "consent" in the "carried bug" cases
could become as technical and logically inconsistent as the finding of actual physi-
cal entry had already become in the "planted bug" cases. Against this background
and with some of its members beginning to regard electronic eavesdropping as a
problem which should be handled under the fourth amendment warrant dause,
the Court decided Osborn v. United States.45
In the Osborn case, a municipal peace officer had informed federal officers that
an attempt might be made to bribe prospective members of a jury being em-
panelled for a case then pending before a federal district court. After examining
an affidavit detailing conversations between the peace officer and Osborn concerning
the possibility of bribing the prospective jurors, two federal district judges au-
thorized the use of a concealed pocket recorder to "learn the truth of the allega-
tions." The affiant went to Osborn's office, but the mission failed when the record-
ing came out garbled. After the affiant testified as to the substance of his second
discussion with Osborn, the judges issued a second authorization for the use of
the eavesdropping device. On the second occasion the device worked well. The
recorded incriminating statements, together with the affiant's testimony, were
instrumental in convicting Osborn. In affirming the conviction, the Court noted
that the eavesdropping order described the conversations sought with particularity,
authorized but one limited intrusion, required a fresh showing of probable cause
to justify a continuation of the eavesdropping when the first attempt failed, and
obligated the officer to make a return on the warrant showing how it was executed
and what was seized. These "discriminate and precise procedures" were pointed
to with approval by the majority in Berger. Justice White, however, criticized the
45385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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majority for failing to appreciate the analogy between New York's interest in pre-
venting corruption of its high state officials and the interest of the district judges
in Osborn in preventing the corruption of their court.
Although the majority in Berger did not, as Justice Black noted in his dissent,
choose to explicitly overrule the Olmstead case in toto, the decision in Berger
represents a substantial abandonment of the Olmstead approach to electronic sur-
veillance. The Olmstead theory that conversations could not be the subject of an
unlawful seizure had been explicitly cast aside in the Wong Sun case, and any
doubt that might have remained in this respect was removed in Berger. The
theory that a physical trespass is a necessary element of an unlawful search had
been greatly weakened by the Court's willingness in recent years to find a physical
intrusion under circumstances where there clearly could be no finding of trespass
under local property law. The Olmstead treatment of the fourth amendment,
affording a limited protection against physical searches and seizures, has been
supplanted by the view that the amendment is a reservoir for the protection of
individual privacy.
Such an interpretation of the fourth amendment is essential if there is to be
meaningful constitutional protection against indiscriminate electronic surveillance
by police and other government officials. The "physical intrusion" test is inade-
quate to deal with even the surveillance of conversation, for devices already exist
which can effectively monitor speech from distances which preclude any realistic
finding of physical intrusion. Devices designed to monitor activity using visual
and infrared techniques are clearly beyond the reach of such a test. The concept of
individual privacy, however, is broad enough to protect against unjustified official
surveillance in whatever form it takes. The Osborn and Berger decisions have set
the stage for an abandonment of the "physical intrusion" approach to electronic
surveillance and the adoption of an approach that recognizes such surveillance as a
search which can only be conducted within the framework of the fourth amend-
ment protections of individual privacy.46
Although the use of a warrant system would effectively eliminate indiscrimi-
nate electronic snooping on the basis of a lack of probable cause, many people
advocate a total ban on all electronic surveillance, public or private. On the other
hand, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice recently reported: "A majority of the members of the Commission believe
that legislation should be enacted granting carefully circumscribed authority for
electronic surveillance to law enforcement officers. .... ,,4T In his dissent in the
Berger case, Justice Black said that the majority's position made it impossible for the
states to have an effective eavesdropping law with which to combat crime. Although
the Berger decision certainly portends strict construction of such laws, it does not
dose the door against them. Indeed, four of nine justices considered the New York
4 6 The "physical intrusion" approach was, in fact, discarded in the recent case of Katz v.
United States, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
4 7PRESIDENT'S COMMIssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION or
JusTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200-03 (1967).
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statute to be consonant with the requirements of the fourth amendment, and
only Justice Douglas seems opposed to the very idea of electronic surveillance.
Legislation pending before the 90th Congress could have a determinative effect
on state laws dealing with electronic surveillance. This legislation consists of two
major bills, each taking an opposite position on the question of official electronic
surveillance. The Right of Privacy Act of 196748 would prohibit, except in respect
to matters affecting national security, all electronic surveillance without the consent
of one of the parties to the conversation. This bill represents the position of the
current administration, and it essentially disavows the position taken by the Presi-
dent's Crime Commission.49 Justice White examined the national security excep-
tion critically in the Berger case, but his misgivings about it may be obviated if the
other position, represented by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1967,50 prevails. In its current form, the latter bill would permit electronic
surveillance by law enforcement officials acting under court order. Presumably,
both bills would rely on the broad principles enunciated in Katzenbach v.
Morgan5 ' to make their provisions binding on the states. It is possible that neither
bill will be passed, in which event the matter of state law retains significance.
The majority opinion in Berger, of its own force and through its approval of
the procedures used in Osborn, furnishes some guidelines for state legislation per-
mitting limited official surveillance. At the outset, electronic surveillance should
be prohibited unless conducted pursuant to a realistic prior authorization process
that safeguards against indiscriminate snooping. The issuance of any warrant or
other prior authorization should be under the control of "a neutral and detached
magistrate," rather than police officials. The issuing magistrate should preside over
a court which has jurisdiction to try the crime sought to be investigated. This would
assure that he is familiar with the evidence involved in such crimes and, therefore,
qualified to weigh the merits of an application. Because of the serious interference
with individual privacy inherent in any eavesdropping, its use should extend only
to certain major crimes. These crimes should be defined and should include only
those as to which such surveillance is ordinarily a substantially valuable investiga-
tive tool.
The officer seeking authorization to eavesdrop should be required to provide,
under oath, facts showing reasonable grounds to believe that information vital to
the solution or prevention of a specific crime can be obtained by such surveillance
during a designated time interval. To prevent the use of electronic surveillance
as a shortcut to obtain evidence that could, albeit with more difficulty, be gathered
by conventional investigative techniques, the officer should also be required to show
that the information sought cannot be reasonably obtained without such surveil-
lance. The purpose of these two requirements would be to satisfy the need for
a showing of probable cause and to provide the special facts Justice Clark held must
48S. 928 and H.R. 5386, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
4 0THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY, supra note 47, at 200-03.
50S. 917 and H.R. 5038, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
51384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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be present to overcome the lack of notice.
A statute should also require that the person or persons on whom, and the place
in which, the surveillance is to be practiced be described with particularity.
The kind of evidence sought should be particularly described, but in this respect
only the anticipated nature of the conversations sought can be reasonably demanded.
A maximum time for which a surveillance authorization could be granted should
be fixed in the statute. Justice Clark indicated that authorization for a 60-day
period was equivalent to authority for a series of searches supported by only one
showing of probable cause. This analysis seems to rest too heavily on a comparison
to the time intervals, seldom exceeding a day, associated with conventional
searches. The reasonableness of the authorization period for a search is fundamen-
tally a matter involving the character of the object of the search and the difficulty
inherent in finding it. The mere fact that it might take several days, for example,
to search a house for a hypodermic tip should not make that search unreasonable
because it would only take minutes to search the same house for an anti-tank gun.
Evidence in the form of spoken words is of such a fleeting nature that a search
for such evidence must necessarily begin a considerable time before that evidence
actually comes into being in the place under surveillance. As Justice Harlan points
out,5' 2 moreover, the reasonableness of the authorization time depends on the
character of the offense and its complexity in terms of the number of people and
transactions associated with it.
Any renewal of the authorization beyond the original period should, however,
require another showing of present probable cause. In weighing the case for an
extension, the magistrate should consider the success or failure of the initial sur-
veillance. No authorization should be granted for surveillance in regard to one
crime when the evidence offered in justification comes from an earlier surveillance
in respect to an unrelated crime. This requirement would discourage any dilution
of the requirement for probable cause.
Finally, in order to prevent abuse of the authority after it is given, the statute
should provide for automatic termination of the authority as soon as the evidence
sought is substantially obtained. A procedure should be prescribed whereby the
issuing magistrate will be kept apprised of the progress of the surveillance so that
he may determine whether its purpose has been served or whether it was im-
providently granted and should be terminated early.
It is suggested that any statute authorizing electronic surveillance by court order
embody the requirements implicit in the Berger decision. These requirements are
surely stringent, but, as that case amply demonstrates, vagueness and omission will
doom such a statute. Electronic surveillance would then no longer be a tool for
generating leads where before there was little more than suspicion. A substantial,
independent case would have to be developed before electronic surveillance could
be authorized. This necessarily diminishes the utility of such surveillance to law
enforcement officials, but it correspondingly strengthens the security of the indi-
vidual's privacy.
5287 S. Ct 1873, 1905 (1967).
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